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abstract
This paper traces the origins of the post-transitional justice efforts by the Spanish gov-
ernment to recognize and offer reparations for the human rights crimes committed dur-
ing the Spanish Civil War and subsequent Franco dictatorship. After a delay of at least 
thirty years, reparation legislation was enacted in 2007 with the passage of the Historical 
Memory Law, which is regarded as one of Spain’s most ambitious measures to address its 
past human rights violations. This thesis argues that three main factors encouraged the 
Law’s passage.  First, Spanish involvement in foreign social justice shined a spotlight on 
Spain’s own unsettled past. Second, the maturation of a younger generation that did not 
experience the worst years of the dictatorship turned public opinion in favor of repara-
tion. Finally, the Law was introduced under opportune political circumstances and en-
compassed minimal reparations in order to receive the necessary congressional vote.
INTRODUCTION
When Spanish leader Francisco Franco died in 1975 after a rule of over three decades marked by human rights abuses, 
Spain underwent a radical change in governance 
from dictatorship to democracy. During this 
transition, the country did not respond to the 
human rights abuses of the Franco regime, or, in 
other words, it failed to pursue transitional justice. 
Transitional justice is defined as “the array of legal 
and political mechanisms devised to hold departing 
authoritarian regimes accountable for their political 
transgressions.”1 This field of study began with the 
Nuremburg trials in the 1940s and was popularized 
by a worldwide wave of democratization in the 
1980s that occurred from southern Europe to Latin 
America. Most countries engaged in transitions from 
authoritarian systems of government to democracy, 
such as Portugal and Chile, immediately pursue 
accountability and reparation measures for crimes 
committed by their fallen authoritarian regimes. 
Spain, however, is distinctive in its decision to ignore 
its past human rights violations, amid the fear that 
doing so would destabilize the new democracy.2 
Nevertheless, Spain eventually faced both foreign 
and domestic demands to pursue what can be 
referred to as “post-transitional justice.”3 With 
pressure mounting in October 2007, the country 
achieved a monumental piece of justice legislation, 
the Historical Memory Law, which addressed the 
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human rights violations that took place under the 
dictatorship of General Francisco Franco.4 Scholars 
have speculated on the motivations behind this 
surge of renewed concern for Francoist crimes, 
yet the analysis of Spain’s recent accountability 
and reparation measures has been limited and 
explanations are incomplete. This article strives to 
contribute to this sparsely researched area of Spanish 
social justice. Understanding the context in which 
the Historical Memory Law was passed could help to 
illustrate why accountability for Franco-era crimes 
became an issue on the political agenda so many 
years after the collapse of the Franco regime and not 
earlier. 
BACKGROUND
The Crimes of the Franco Regime
Francisco Franco’s dictatorship in Spain, which 
lasted from 1939 to 1975, began after a gruesome 
three-year Civil War between the Republicans, who 
were loyal to the established Spanish Republic, and 
the Nationalists, a rebel group led by General Franco. 
The crimes of the Franco regime can be divided into 
two phases: the years immediately following the war 
(1939–1947) and a more stable period that lasted 
until the regime fell in 1975. The most serious crimes 
occurred during the former period, but political 
crimes continued throughout the latter.5 
As part of a deliberate system of revenge, 
Francoist troops targeted civilians in locales of 
Republican support in the immediate post-war 
years.6 Around 440,000 Republicans were exiled 
immediately after the war, 10,000 of whom died in 
Nazi concentration camps. Mass trials and executions 
occurred regularly, with Franco showing little 
restraint in signing death warrants. Some 400,000 
people were subjected to forced labor, torture, 
prison time, or internment camps. The number of 
these “official” victims who suffered directly from 
repression policies is unclear and the number of 
those who were terrorized, kidnapped, and murdered 
in secret is almost impossible to determine. 
Children were separated from their Republican 
parents and often adopted into families of Franco 
loyalists without ever knowing their true origin. 
Although many of these crimes continued well into 
the later years of the dictatorship, later violations 
by the Franco regime consisted mostly of political 
sentencing and torturing of government opponents.7 
Forgetting the Past
Despite this horrifying past, or perhaps 
because of it, Spain chose to forego any system of 
accountability after Franco’s death in 1975 and during 
the subsequent transition to democracy. There was 
an attempted coup d’état in 1981, in which the Civil 
Guard tried to reinstate the military government of 
the past thirty-five years. Although the coup failed, 
it demonstrated the precariousness of the new 
democracy. In response, victims chose to protect the 
country’s democratic achievements at the expense 
of reparation. Rather than speak openly about 
the Franco regime’s crimes, Spain adhered to an 
unspoken Pacto del Silencio or Pacto de Olvido (Pact 
of Silence).8 The first democratic Parliament after 
the dictatorship passed an Amnesty Law in October 
1977 that pardoned all political crimes, regardless 
of nature or outcome, including those committed 
by the Franco regime against its enemies.9 Many 
scholars have argued that this path allowed for a 
peaceful governmental transition and helped stabilize 
the new democracy.10 In fact, despite its neglect of 
justice processes, Spain’s transition is regarded as 
a model for securing strong democratic outcomes 
after a dictatorship. Conversely, according to some 
academics, Portugal’s proactive investigations into 
past crimes during its transition compromised 
democratic stability. Per this view, these pursuits 
distracted the country from political reconciliation.11 
Following this reasoning, the UN has historically 
supported laws granting amnesty and preventing 
prosecution as a means of restoring peace and 
solidifying democratic governments.12 Nevertheless, 
in choosing this method of transition, Spain did not 
fully conclude its tragic past. Moreover, a general 
consensus exists that this law is unconstitutional and 
incompatible with international human rights law.13
Several obstacles perpetuated Spain’s pact 
of silence and hindered judicial inquiry into the 
Franco government’s violations. The first obstacle 
concerns statutes of limitations embedded in most 
legal systems, including Spain’s. These statutes ensure 
that prosecution for a crime may occur only within 
a reasonable period after the crime is committed. 
However, counterarguments hold that such statutes 
do not apply to Franco-era government violations, 
for the disappearances have not been solved, making 
them ongoing crimes. Another obstacle pertains 
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to basic due process rights for the accused; these 
cannot be upheld, as the deceased are unable to 
defend themselves.14 Retroactive justice scholar 
Angela Guarino argues that fighting to bring justice 
to crimes whose perpetrators are likely deceased is 
unproductive and others assert that attaining justice 
for the crimes of past regimes is unnecessary and 
simply unrealistic.15  However, to other scholars 
investigating Franco-era crimes, such as Mónica 
Zapico Barbeito, the purpose of retroactive justice 
is not only to ensure justice, but also to establish 
the truth about the crimes committed and to grant 
reparations to those affected.16 
The Historical Memory Law
While Spain evaded a transitional justice 
process in the early stages of the new government, 
the country faced increasing pressure at the turn of 
this century to reveal the past transgressions of the 
Franco regime. The Franco regime’s human rights 
violations were neglected for decades until around 
2000 when a nongovernmental organization, the 
Association for the Recuperation of Historical 
Memory (ARMH), was created to assist private 
initiatives in exhuming mass graves and investigating 
the fate of disappeared persons.17 Subsequently, in 
2006, a “fever for remembering” occurred, when 
the Spanish public pressed the government to 
acknowledge the truth behind Franco-era crimes.18
In October 2007, Spain officially acknowledged 
the actions of Franco’s dictatorship as “unjust” for 
the first time by passing the Historical Memory Law. 
19 The Law received international and domestic 
attention for its efforts to finally address the country’s 
silenced past. However, in an attempt to achieve 
broad appeal, the Law intentionally did not refer 
to any historical or collective memory, nor did it 
establish an account of what human rights violations 
took place, nor did it condemn the Franco regime 
for its actions. It simply recognized each citizen’s 
right to “personal and family memory,” or the right 
to investigate crimes pertaining directly to one’s 
family.20  The bill created a process for victims to 
seek a “Declaration of Reparations and Personal 
Recognition,” enhanced the pensions of Republican 
survivors and Franco-era political prisoners, and 
instructed local administrative units to help locate 
and exhume mass graves. Further, it required 
removal of partisan commemorative symbols and 
prohibited political acts at the Valley of the Fallen, 
Franco’s burial site.21
While the Socialist Worker’s Party (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español, or PSOE) introduced the 
Historical Memory Law expecting quick, unanimous 
passage, the political process for the Law proved 
unexpectedly contentious. The country’s two main 
political parties, the center-left PSOE and the center-
right Popular Party (Partido Popular, or PP), had 
both been active in the debate for retroactive justice 
in Spain. The PP objected to the proposal for the 
Law in its entirety, accusing the PSOE of attempting 
to destroy Spain’s democratic transition.22 Some 
attribute the PP’s position to the public ties party 
members and their families had to Franco’s 
institutions.23 Despite these opposing views and the 
resulting political drama, Congress eventually agreed 
upon a revised version of the legislation, which 
passed with 127 votes for and 119 against (115 of 
which were from the PP).24 
Breaking the Silence
 The question remains as to what propelled 
the new push for Spanish transitional justice 
that materialized in the Historical Memory Law. 
Furthermore, there is no agreement on why the new 
law was passed when it was. Transitional justice 
literature suggests that ethical principles do not 
drive pursuits for accountability and reparations, but 
rather a combination of other elements condition the 
process.25 Thus, to discover why the first reparations 
law in Spain passed in 2007 and not earlier, I conduct 
a situational examination rather than an ethical 
one. Furthermore, by examining trends at both 
the domestic and international levels, I provide an 
account thorough enough to explain why reparations 
legislation was finally passed in 2007. 
It is important to recognize that the 
conversation for justice is not exclusively a domestic 
matter, as foreign governments and organizations 
also play a role. Carmen González Enríquez claims 
that active advocacy, including international 
advocacy, is central to guaranteeing prosecution of 
human rights crimes. 26 In her opinion, lobbying and 
political strategizing by the international community 
is consequential.27 Additionally, the desire and 
perceived need to enter the “European family” may 
favor transitional justice.28 Whether and how these 
international factors played a role in the Spanish 
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pursuit of justice is discussed in Section 1 of this 
thesis. 
While the international factor may be 
important, the local community and public opinion 
cannot be ignored.29 In transitioning countries, 
retroactive justice is not intended to deter further 
crime, but rather to validate the rights of citizens 
and legitimize young democratic governments. 
Some believe that new state authorities must address 
these violations; otherwise they may be construed 
as retroactively supporting the perpetrators.30 
Eijkman explains that public opinion on the priority 
of justice determines whether the prosecutions are 
appropriate.31 Internal pressure is examined in 
Section 2, which compares the Spanish populace 
of 2006, when the Historical Memory Law was 
introduced, to that of previous periods.
Finally, differing ideas on retribution and 
reparations often become attached to political parties, 
making politics a crucial element in transitional 
justice. The agendas of these parties can mobilize 
demands for justice, and other political factors, such 
as institutions, can shape the way a country confronts 
its difficult past.32 For example, the PSOE and the 
PP have been strategic in advocating for and against 
reparations, with the latter even defining justice 
attempts as an attack on the foundation of Spanish 
democracy.33 Such political factors behind the 
passage of the Historical Memory Law are explored 
in Section 3. 
Although modest compared to the desires of the 
political left, the Historical Memory Law attempted 
to break the country’s silence and amnesia regarding 
past human rights violations. In this article, political 
debate, media reporting, and interviews surrounding 
the passage of the Historical Memory Law are used 
as evidence for the proposed motivations behind the 
justice concerns in Spain. In the subsequent sections, 
I argue that the bill came at a time of renewed interest 
in Francoism and the Civil War. Developments in 
international criminal law and victims’ rights norms 
encouraged initial self-reflection in the country. 
Further, a new generation of social and political 
participants that were willing to discuss past justice 
problems was replacing those who had lived and 
suffered through the Civil War and the Franco 
dictatorship.  Finally, the politicians found reparation 
electorally favorable in 2006 and engaged in strategic 
negotiations to ensure the Law’s passage. Looking at 
the international, generational, and political contexts 
provides a comprehensive understanding of the 
factors that led to the Historical Memory Law. 
 
METHODS
Parliamentary dialogues retrieved from the 
online journal of the Spanish Congress of Deputies 
were examined to assess the political debate on 
the Historical Memory Law. These journals were 
obtained from the website of the Congress of 
Deputies, http://www.congreso.es, which organized 
the journals by parliament session. The particular 
journals analyzed were retrieved by searching 
speeches in the eighth legislative session (2004–2008) 
under the keywords Guerra civil y la dictadura, 
which were contained in the title of the original bill. 
The search yielded three journals, from October 31, 
2007, December 14, 2006, and November 11, 2006. 
On these dates the debate of the Law was recorded, 
with members of each parliamentary party speaking 
on particulars of the bill, offering amendments, 
and expressing overall support or concerns. The 
political parties that spoke on the bill included 
the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE), the 
Democratic Popular Party (PP), the Vasco Party, the 
Parliamentary Coalition of the Canaries and New 
Canaries, the Catalán parliamentary group known 
as Convergence and Union, the United Left, the 
Republican Left of Catalonia, and the Mixed Group 
comprised of nine members belonging to parties 
not large enough to create their own parliamentary 
group. 
In each session, members of all parties 
contributed to the debate over the Historical Memory 
Law. Generally, in each session, only one speaker 
for each party spoke on behalf of the entire party, 
expressing all the positions, concerns, and opinions 
of that group. The three congressional sessions 
were screened for speeches, culminating in thirty-
six speeches that in total comprised the various 
party stances in Congress at the time. The debate 
was analyzed for several factors. First, to evaluate 
politicians’ receptiveness to the Law, complaints 
about the bill were monitored. These complaints were 
recorded in areas where justice was still considered to 
be incomplete after the Law was passed, according to 
findings from the literature review. Any complaints 
outside this time condition were documented as 
“other complaints.” The recorded areas included: 
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– complaints about the Valley of the Fallen; 
– proper documentation of the dictatorship and 
Civil War; 
– sufficient apology or recognition of victims; 
– condemnation of the Franco regime or 
establishment of a truth commission; 
– concrete policy on the exhumation of mass 
graves; 
– annulment of summary judgments during the 
Franco regime; and
– prosecution of perpetrators of human rights 
violations. 
Any comment that was disapproving toward, 
critical of, or opposed to the bill was considered 
a “complaint.” A “complaint” was not necessarily 
negative in tone, but also included any constructive 
comment that suggested changes, ways to improve 
the bill, or personal desires for the bill that had not 
yet been addressed. Additionally, to assess overall 
satisfaction with the bill, a parliamentary member’s 
overall judgment of the bill as either “sufficient,” 
“insufficient,” or “neutral” was recorded. Judgments 
recorded as “insufficient” were readily apparent 
in speeches that referred to the bill as “lacking,” 
“not enough,” “disappointing,” or “insufficient.” If 
explicit language was not used, then speeches that 
contained arguments for further reparation were 
marked as “insufficient” interpretations, while 
those that lacked such arguments and expressed 
optimism or satisfaction with the bill were marked 
“sufficient.” When an argument did not clearly fall 
into these categories or when there were conflicting 
interpretations in the same argument, it was marked 
as neutral. 
References to the international community, 
such as international human rights law, Spanish 
involvement with the Pinochet case, or international 
interest groups such as Amnesty International, were 
documented within the congressional debate entries. 
These references were important in assessing what 
role the international community played in passing 
the Law and gauging how often debate referenced the 
international stage. Furthermore, the congressional 
debate was tracked for any evidence of a generational 
change occurring within Spain and among the 
congressional representatives. For example, if a 
member stressed a need to do justice for his or her 
grandparents or alluded to an inability to pass such 
a law previously because of the instability of Spain’s 
democracy, his or her comment was included in 
generational tracking.  Finally, the congressional 
debate entries were tagged with the political party 
with which each respective speaker is affiliated. This 
allowed me to better see how party politics affected 
the shaping and passage of the Law.
Congressional debate data was supplemented 
with an analysis of arguments for the Historical 
Memory Law found in the two most circulated 
newspapers in Spain, El País and El Mundo. El País 
has a loosely liberal affiliation, while El Mundo 
skews slightly conservative. Using both of these 
sources ensured inclusion of the most relevant 
articles and a representative sample of arguments 
associated with both ideologies. Furthermore, it 
was possible to compare the coverage of both of 
these newspapers to reveal any partisan differences. 
Articles and opinion pieces from 1990 to 2013 were 
gathered in the LexisNexis database using search 
terms corresponding to the Historical Memory Law, 
human rights, and the Franco dictatorship. Duplicate 
articles and editorials were eliminated, as well as 
false positives that did not refer directly to the above 
search criteria. The extent of news coverage was 
quantified as the number of articles within certain 
time frames that referenced the Historical Memory 
Law, Franco, international human rights, and 
indications of generational changes, such as appeals 
to justice for grandparents. 
The final data source consisted of interviews 
that were conducted in person in Madrid, Spain 
in the summer of 2013. These interviews were 
designed to obtain opinions of those familiar with 
the Historical Memory Law in order to elucidate 
what some people view as its benefits and drawbacks. 
Furthermore, these interviews were used to gain 
insight into the reason the bill was on the political 
agenda, public opinion on the Law, and general 
perspectives on the debate that may not have been 
acquired through analyses of journal and newspaper 
documents. Lastly, information gathered from 
these interviews was used to enhance the historical 
background behind the transitional justice process in 
Spain. 
The most useful interview was with Carlos 
Castresana-Fernandez, a renowned Spanish 
prosecutor, criminal law professor, and head of the 
International Commission against Organized Crime 
in Guatemala (CICIG). He has particular expertise 
in Spanish justice, as a consequence of having 
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worked with Superior Courts of Justice of Madrid 
and Catalonia, as well as in the Special Prosecutor’s 
Offices against Corruption. Castresana-Fernandez 
is an expert in international human rights and has 
won many honors for his work in the subject area, 
including the National Award for Human Rights in 
Spain in 1997 and the Human Rights Award from the 
Argentina Association of Human Rights in 1999. The 
interview took place on August 29, 2013.
Additional interviews were conducted with 
Patricia Esteban, a resident of Madrid and professor 
of Spanish literature at the Universidad San Pablo; 
Juan Pulgar, a lawyer in Madrid; and Pilar Pulgar, 
a worker residing in Madrid who lived through the 
Franco dictatorship.
RESULTS
Section 1: International Context
The renewed interest in justice and 
accountability that occurred in Spain in the 2000s 
after years of observance of the pacto de olvido was 
situated in a unique moment on the international 
stage and in the evolution of international law. 
Post-transitional justice in Spain resulted from a 
variety of international factors including elevated 
international pressure, the establishment of 
international human rights laws, Spain’s involvement 
in foreign transitional justice, and the progression 
of transitional justice in other countries in the late 
1990s. 
Active International Pressure
Spain was not required to address its past 
human rights violations by the international 
communities it joined following the democratic 
transition; however, the international community 
did actively contribute to Spain’s “fever for 
remembering.”34 When Spain joined the Council of 
Europe in 1977, the Council did not impose entry 
requirements pertaining to Franco-era crimes. 
Although in 1950 this Council forged the European 
Convention of Human Rights, an international treaty 
to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in Europe, it did not attempt to apply this doctrine 
retroactively to Spain and force the country to offer 
reparations to victims of the Franco government.35 
As a result, Spain did not face pressure to pursue 
transitional justice in the 1970s. The country’s 
subsequent entry into the European Union in 1986 
similarly occurred without any precondition relating 
to Spain’s pursuit of accountability.36 Therefore, in 
the 1980s, the international community still did not 
require Spain to acknowledge Franco-era crimes or 
bring justice to Franco-regime victims.
More recently, the European Union has strictly 
imposed reparation conditions on countries before 
granting membership. Entry requirements for 
Serbia included the surrender of all war criminals 
to the former Yugoslavian tribunal.37 Conditions 
were also imposed on the Czech Republic and all 
former members of the Warsaw Pact. Spain and 
Portugal, however, were both accepted without 
such demands.38 Thus, a direct request by the 
international community never drove the Spanish 
pursuit of justice through the Historical Memory 
Law. The Law also had no direct repercussions for 
Spain in the international community, so Spain 
should have felt no pressure via the international 
stage to address its transitional justice concerns.39 
Although there were initially no specific 
international demands for Spain to address victims 
of the Franco regime, later requests by non-
governmental international organizations resonated 
with the country, which could help explain why 
post-transitional justice occurred in 2007 and not 
earlier. Amnesty International implored Spain to 
do justice for the thousands of victims up until and 
even after the Historical Memory Law was passed.40 
These appeals were publicized to the Spanish 
population through El País in articles from May 
and November of 2003. In the May 2003 article, the 
newspaper covered Amnesty International’s support 
of new initiatives honoring Civil War victims and 
exhumations of mass graves.41 Likewise, in 2002, the 
United Nations Human Rights Office recommended 
that Spain “investigate the disappearance at the 
hands of the Franco regime [of] at least two cases 
of Republicans shot after the Civil War.”42 El País 
featured this recommendation on November 16, 
2002, which consequently sparked an immediate and 
unprecedented motion in Parliament on November 
20 condemning Franco’s uprising in 1936 as an illegal 
rebellion against a legitimate government.43 This 
earlier reaction by the Spanish Parliament to the 
request of international organizations suggests that 
the pressure from such organizations contributed to 
the milieu in which the Historical Memory Law was 
passed. In sum, international pressure grew in the 
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early 2000s, which fostered dialogue on transitional 
justice issues.
Building International Norms
In addition to the pressure directly exerted 
on Spain by international actors, the evolution of 
international human rights norms has had a great 
influence on the trajectory of the Historical Memory 
Law debate. These developments began with the 
Nuremberg trials in 1945, when the United Nations 
resolved that atrocities like those of World War II 
should never recur. The United Nations adopted 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights three 
years later, though this declaration and the similar 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (1992) are not legally 
binding. 44 In contrast, the UN’s International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights are legally binding human rights agreements, 
effective as of 1976. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted in 
1998 and put into effect in 2002, establishing four 
core international crimes: genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.45 
Spain ratified the Rome Statute in 2000, although 
the Court did not have retroactive power to look 
into Spain’s past. Finally, in 2005, drawing on the 
efforts of previous doctrines, the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law defined and outlined thirteen 
necessary parameters of reparation. According 
to this retroactive standard, full and effective 
reparation requires restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-
repetition.46 Moreover, the parameters explicitly 
obligate prosecution of persons allegedly responsible 
for human rights violations, provision of proper 
assistance to victims seeking access to justice, and 
the inapplicability of statutes of limitations.47 
With the accumulation of all such human rights 
doctrines, the UN has a basis for recommendations 
on handling human rights violations, including the 
2002 recommendation to Spain discussed previously. 
Finally, since Spain is part of the UN community, 
all such norms that have retroactive power apply to 
Spain for Franco violations. 
This evolution of criminal law in the 2000s set 
the stage for Spain’s renewed interest in Franco-era 
crimes.48 Almost 20 percent of debate speeches on 
the Historical Memory Law cited World War II as the 
origin of the international criminal law applicable 
to Spain, referring to it as the structural basis of 
European democratic culture and the foundation 
of the core European value of human rights.49 
Speeches also acknowledged the sixtieth anniversary 
of the precedent’s existence.50 Moreover, 36 percent 
of the debate speeches explicitly accused Spain of 
violating established international human rights 
doctrines, indicating that deputies were cognizant 
and respectful of the norms that the international 
community expected to be upheld. 
In the debate over the Historical Memory 
Law, 71.4 percent of deputy accusations referred to 
the violation of some UN human rights doctrine. 
Most accusations cited noncompliance with UN 
International Covenants of Human Rights, followed 
by neglect of the Rome Statute. Other UN doctrines, 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
were mentioned less often. Specifically, Joan Tardà 
i Coma of the Republican Left argued on October 
31, 2007, that “[Spain] deliberately ignored UN 
resolution 95 on the recognition of judgments and 
the principles of international law arising from 
Nuremberg.”51 He referred to the mandatory 
subrogation requirement, whereby one person 
takes over the rights or remedies of another against 
a third party, implying that the current Congress 
was responsible for remedying the Franco regime’s 
violations against Spanish citizens. Similarly, Deputy 
Begoña Lasagabaster Olazábal complained that 
the bill did not adhere to the UN doctrine on war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.52 In this 
sense, although the United Nations did not impose 
demands on Spain to execute post-transitional 
justice, the norms the organization set came alive 
during the Historical Memory Law debate. Even if 
UN human rights norms did not directly influence 
reparation, they at least pressured the Spanish 
Congress to answer more questions about justice for 
crimes against humanity in 2006 than in any previous 
year. 
The Council of Europe’s human rights 
developments, specifically the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) also 
played a large role in the debate, with 28.5 percent of 
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the accusations and 11 percent of the entire debate 
referencing statements made by the organization. 
For example, Aitor Esteban Bravo of the Vasco 
Group insisted that the parameters for judging the 
Historical Memory Law should not be limited to the 
Spanish constitution, but should also include the 
ECHR.53 Arguments for the existence of a general 
international human rights norm appeared in 42.9 
percent of the accusations and 16.7 percent of the 
debate. Congressional deputies referred to the need 
to explicitly condemn the Franco regime and combat 
historical relativism painting Franco as a “soft” 
dictator in order to abide by this norm.54 Overall, 
more than 50 percent of the bill debate referenced 
some international human rights development, 
giving voice to the international community along 
the route to the Historical Memory Law’s passage. 
Moreover, El País consistently referred to 
UN human rights doctrine and the Rome Statute 
in articles from 2000 to 2008, thereby informing 
the Spanish public of the existence of such norms 
during this time. 55, i  The dominant Spanish 
news source highlighting these norms for other 
human rights cases created an interactive space that 
fostered Spanish citizens’ introspection on Spain’s 
compliance with these standards. Expressing interest 
in this international doctrine on human rights, 
the Spanish public responded with 380 opinion 
pieces on human rights and UN doctrine in El País 
between 2000 and 2007. These findings suggest that 
international human rights norms informed both 
the political debate and the Spanish media. Perhaps 
most importantly, they indicate the extent to which 
the Spanish populace reacted to these international 
norms around the introduction of the Historical 
Memory Law in 2006. This, in turn, demonstrated 
the saliency of this issue in Spanish politics and 
pressured Spanish politicians to take action. 
At the turn of the millennium, public interest 
in human rights concerns peaked in response 
to media stories of crimes against humanity and 
justice around the world. The increased attention 
to such concerns primed discussions over domestic 
human rights and ultimately increased attention to 
Franco violations. Overall, the prevalence of human 
rights development and international justice norms 
in the Congressional debates highlights that the 
development of international human rights helped 
i  380 articles between 2000 and 2008 in El País, retrieved from LexisNexis 
Academic.
shape the reparations discussion in Spain. 
The Justice Cascade
Another key component of the international 
environment facing Spain in the early 2000s was the 
progression in transitional justice that had taken 
place in other countries, especially those in Latin 
America. Transitional justice was pursued in Chile, 
Argentina, and Guatemala in the late 1990s, ICC 
cases were brought against Uganda, Congo, Sudan, 
and South Africa in the early 2000s, and truth 
commissions were created in twenty-five countries 
during these two decades.56 These occurrences left 
people wondering when Spain’s victims would have 
their turn for justice. In an opinion piece in El País, 
Javier Maravall wrote: 
Argentina and Chile, in their democratic 
transition processes, looked to the Spanish 
transition as a model of peaceful and 
consensual change. Maybe it’s time you 
España look now to processes that have 
occurred in these two brotherly countries to 
clarify human rights violations that occurred 
during the dictatorship of General Francisco 
Franco (1939-1975).57 
From 1997 onward, El País featured several 
other opinion pieces contrasting reconciliation 
in Spain with that in other countries, particularly 
Argentina and Chile.58 Spain not only witnessed 
accountability measures in other countries with 
similar pasts, but also actively participated in 
these cases. In 1999, Guatemalan citizen Rigoberta 
Menchú used the Spanish High Court to bring a 
case against the Guatemalan military leadership 
for human rights violations against indigenous 
populations during its civil war. In June 2003, 
Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón jailed a former naval 
officer of the Argentine military dictatorship after he 
was extradited from Mexico to Spain pending trial 
for genocide and terrorism. 
In September 2005, Spain’s Constitutional Court 
ruled that the “principle of universal jurisdiction 
prevails over the existence of national interests,” 
allowing the National Court to reach beyond 
national borders in cases of torture, terrorism, or 
war crimes, even when no Spanish victims were 
involved. Subsequently, on January 11, 2006, the 
Court initiated an investigation into seven former 
Chinese officials, including former President Jiang 
Zemin, who allegedly took part in genocide in Tibet. 
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On July 7 of that year, six Guatemalan officials were 
formally charged to appear in the Spanish Court in 
regard to the Menchú case. This is the environment 
in which the Historical Memory Law was passed 
in 2006. Unsurprisingly, people began to demand 
Spain’s own accountability for human rights crimes 
considering that Spain was playing such a central role 
in many cases regarding international human rights 
crimes.
The case of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, 
one of Spain’s early probes into foreign human 
rights crimes, was pivotal in fostering pressure for 
Spanish vindications of Franco-era crimes.59 In 
1998, Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón issued an 
international arrest warrant for General Pinochet 
for ninety-four counts of torture of Spanish citizens 
and for the 1975 assassination of Spanish politician 
Carmelo Soria.60 The charges filed by Spain for 
infractions that were not only in another country 
but on another continent highlighted the Spanish 
government’s hypocrisy. Spanish citizens and the 
international community alike wondered why the 
country would provide justice for the victims of 
another dictatorship but not for its own victims.61  
Such reflections appeared in sixteen articles in Agence 
News Press and a range of other international news 
sources, including The New York Times.62 The bulk of 
such international media occurred in 1998. Spanish 
citizens raised the same concerns in El País opinion 
pieces, with one professor saying, “…when we asked 
[sic] that Pinochet be held accountable, we must 
prove that there is no contradiction between our 
peculiar relation with the Franco dictatorship and the 
request for Pinochet’s prosecution. Or there must be 
very good reasons for holding different criteria.”63  
The debate over the Historical Memory Law 
featured identical sentiments. For instance, Joan 
Tardà i Coma noted the “contradiction that Spanish 
state judges pursue crimes committed in Chile or 
Argentina a few years ago instead of in the State 
itself.”64 In fact, a third of the debate speeches looked 
to the legal protection of victims in other countries 
as precedents, with two-thirds directly referring to 
Spain’s involvement in the Pinochet case. Although 
Patricia Esteban conceded that there was a difference 
in sensitivity between dealing with Spain’s issues 
and with those in other countries, she too felt that 
Spain’s involvement in foreign justice issues was 
“paradoxical.” Clearly, the debate over the Historical 
Memory Law was shaped partially by the irony of 
Spain condemning foreign human rights abuses 
while failing to address its own. 
“Honeymoons” for Justice
Spain’s lack of engagement in any international 
conflict also made the pursuit of reparations 
plausible in 2006.65 Spanish lawyer, judge, and 
magistrate Carlos Castresana-Fernandez refers 
to periods of international calm, like this period, 
as “honeymoons” for justice.66 For example, the 
international tranquility just after World War II 
nurtured the Nuremburg trial process; however, 
justice efforts following this early post-World War 
II period were suspended for almost half a century 
until the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 ushered in an international peace that 
allowed for retroactive introspection worldwide. An 
enormous volume of justice occurred in the next 
decade that had been impossible during the fifty 
years of the Cold War, including the aforementioned 
Latin American cases.67 Still, even the late 1990s did 
not prove politically favorable for Spanish justice, as 
demonstrated in Section 3. 
The honeymoon of the 1990s ended with the 
attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001. Although the 
Iraq War lasted until 2011, Spain pulled troops out of 
Iraq in 2004 under Zapatero, reinstating international 
peace for Spain. With the onset of the 2008 economic 
crisis, however, such international stability ended, 
limiting the government’s ability to carry out 
reparations requiring heavy state involvement.68 
Therefore during the few crucial years between 2004 
and 2008, Spain was sufficiently at ease to pursue 
reconciliation with its past. 
As discussed in Section 3, the international 
peace coincided with domestic political 
developments to make reparation a possibility. Both 
of these conditions were necessary, but neither was 
sufficient, to usher in reparations legislation. 
Ultimately, requests made by international 
organizations such as the United Nations and 
Amnesty International resonated with the 
country and elicited a reaction. The development 
of international human rights norms informed 
and framed the political debate of the Historical 
Memory Law. The justice cascade at the turn of the 
millennium provided the momentum needed to 
ignite Spanish retrospection, and the Pinochet case 
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focused attention on Spain’s particular unresolved 
issues. Finally, an international peace was conducive 
to action on the part of the Spanish government. It 
was the confluence of these developments, not one 
in particular, that accounted for the international 
contribution to the “fever for remembering” and 
ultimately the passage of the Historical Memory 
Law.69 Still, generational turnover and political 
cooperation, discussed in the next sections, are what 
made reparation most plausible in the early 2000s as 
opposed to earlier years. 
Section 2: Generational Turnover
During the Socialist PSOE rule from 1982 
to 1996, the government shied away from significant 
accountability and reparation measures. In the 
following terms from 1996 to 2004, the majority 
Popular Party showed reluctance to invoke heavy 
reparations. During a renewed PSOE term from 2004 
to 2012 under Prime Minister Rodriguez Zapatero, 
however, a new opportunity for reparations arose. Yet 
this new opportunity was more than just the result 
of a political changeover. With the passing time and 
changing governments, a simultaneous generational 
transition occurred. The composition of the Spanish 
general public moved from those who were directly 
affected by the Spanish Civil War and the Franco 
dictatorship to a more removed population: their 
children and grandchildren. 
Political Continuity
In many respects, the descendants of the Franco 
era represent a continuity of their predecessors. 
Carlos Castresana-Fernandez noted a “natural 
heritage” in the Spanish lineage originating during 
the Franco dictatorship.70 The end of the Spanish 
dictatorship was not achieved through a defeat of 
the regime, as in Greece, Italy, or Portugal, but rather 
through negotiation. As a result, remnants of the 
dictatorship remain, even in the form of indifference 
toward the past.71 The social group that represented 
and supported the dictatorship now comprises the 
social mass that votes conservative, although it no 
longer holds the same authoritarian values. For 
example, Joan Tardà i Coma chastised the PP for 
allowing a member of the Franco regime, Manuel 
Fraga Irabarne—who was responsible for the police’s 
killing of five workers in Vitoria in 1976—to hold 
a distinguished position in the party.72 Similarly, 
the political opposition during the dictatorship 
now aligns with the leftist parties (ERC and IU) or 
the PSOE. As a result, the same conservative and 
progressive divisions from the dictatorship still exist 
and rotate in and out of office. Because of their ties 
to the Franco regime, the conservatives tend to be 
less interested in pursuing accountability and giving 
reparations to the victims of the Franco regime, 
preferring not to “reopen old wounds,” as university 
professor Patricia Esteban puts it.73 Likewise, 
the liberals, who disproportionately represent the 
victims of the Franco regime, are more inclined to 
pursue these reparations. The number of reparation 
measures these groups have passed while in office 
illustrates this difference. Although they passed a 
similar number of symbolic reparation measures, 
the PP passed only one material reparation during 
its 2000–2004 term, while the PSOE passed fifteen 
during its 2004–2008 term.74, ii 
Reservations of the Elder Generation
The large distinction between the old and 
new generation was visible in other ways as well. 
In an opinion poll conducted by El Mundo in 2006, 
negative opinion towards Franco’s uprising that 
started the Civil War was greater amongst younger 
individuals than amongst the elderly. Moreover, the 
elderly were less inclined to speak on the matter at 
all, as a larger proportion of elderly respondents 
chose not to state any opinion.75 Thus in 2006, the 
elder generation was more hesitant to speak about, 
let alone confront, the terrors of the Franco regime. 
The younger generation, according to Joan Tardà 
i Coma of the Republican Left, was comprised of 
“people who had internalized so much pain and 
terror in the years of transition [that they] only 
dared to undertake timidly a tough journey to 
repair the memory of their parents.”76 Those of 
the previous generation who lived through the 
dictatorship preferred to portray the “placidity” of 
the dictatorship and the normality of life under it.77 
Patricia Esteban, a professor of literature in Madrid, 
noted that some of the elder generation, even today, 
do not regard Franco as a dictator and deny that 
any oppression occurred, despite all investigations 
and evidence indicating otherwise. Although Juan 
Pulgar, a conservative who lived through ten years of 
the dictatorship, conceded that atrocities occurred, 
ii  Five during the PP 2000-2004 term; 6 during the PSOE 2000-2008 term
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he argued that 2006 was not a proper time to deal 
with such matters. He resented that the government’s 
efforts were being directed at “ghosts of the past” 
instead of the economy.78 
A New Pro-Justice Generation
On the other hand, there was a growing trend 
in Spain in the 2000s towards a favorable opinion 
of justice. While only twenty-six opinion pieces 
relating to General Francisco Franco were published 
in El País from 1995 to 1997, there were more than 
200 pieces from 2004 to 2006.79 This suggests a 
growing willingness of the public to engage in debate 
over the dictatorship, which was also reflected in 
the political sphere. To begin, all political parties 
favored democracy in 2006 when the Historical 
Memory Law was introduced, while in the late 1970s, 
authoritarianism still pervaded the country. Deputy 
Esteban Bravo of the Vasco Party maintains that, as of 
2006, no longer was any political party fully in favor 
of silence and against the pursuit of justice, “because 
it is not good for democracy nor for coexistence 
and equality for all citizens.”80 In fact, only three of 
thirty-six speeches during the Historical Memory 
Law debate regarded the Law as “unnecessary.”81 
Even these reservations were strictly directed towards 
particulars of the Law, rather than to the idea of 
reparations in general. The Spanish people’s increased 
willingness to tackle post-transitional justice issues, 
which strongly contrasted the reservations of the 
Civil War generation, opening a door for debate over 
reparation and accountability that was previously 
barred.
How do we know, however, that Spanish 
politicians’ increased willingness to consider 
reparations legislation is the result of a new 
generation rather than simply the consequence of a 
favorable political climate? To examine this question, 
we may turn to both interviews and debate speeches. 
Patricia Esteban discussed how children in Spain did 
not, and still do not, learn in full about Spain’s recent 
history and the extent of the Franco dictatorship and 
its human rights violations, as these topics have been 
considered almost taboo.82 Thus, many children 
and grandchildren of Franco-regime victims became 
tired of being shielded and eager to seek justice 
for their relatives who were never able to procure 
it themselves. Thirty-nine percent of the debate 
speeches on the Historical Memory Law referenced 
the generation of victims’ grandchildren, whether by 
directly acknowledging an old versus new generation 
or by appealing to do justice for their grandparents. 
Jorge Fernández Díaz, for example, mentioned “a 
new generation…[that] does not share the hatreds 
and passions of those who participated in [the Civil 
War.]”83 Although several deputies, like Jordi Xuclà i 
Costa from Convergence and Union, recognized that, 
thirty years ago, the only possible path was one of 
selective amnesia (to usher in the peace and harmony 
necessary for democracy), this new generation 
of deputies agreed that another route was now 
possible. Joan Tardà i Coma effectively embodied this 
conviction during the debate, stating: 
I’m not a person of the transition or who fought 
against Franco. I am one of the grandchildren, 
and my generation… has gone through school 
without studying and without knowing what was 
the struggle against Franco. We know from our 
family tradition, or the explanations of friends, 
colleagues, but we have not studied it. It would 
be impossible for this to happen in France, 
Germany, Portugal, and in so many countries 
that have shown that they have done good.84 
Such comments and attitudes suggest that the new 
interest that Spanish politicians took in reparations 
and accountability for the Franco regime’s crimes 
cannot merely be explained in terms of international 
pressure and political development, but must 
also take intergenerational change into account. 
Grandchildren of Civil War victims were more 
adamant for reparations than their predecessors 
because the younger generation that dominated 
during Zapatero’s term was distanced from past 
horrors. Not only had they evaded the worst of the 
Civil War and dictatorship, but they also grew up 
in a world where the topic was considered taboo. 
This generation rejected the taboo imposed on 
them, instead showing openness towards justice and 
accountability that manifested in a renewed push for 
reparation legislation.
A Decline in Surviving Victims 
The willingness of the grandchildren of the 
victims of the Franco regime to pursue reparation 
measures can in part be attributed to a desire for 
dignity and decent burial for familial victims. Such a 
desire led to the emergence of the Association for the 
Recuperation of Historical Memory (ARMH), which 
drove early attempts to break the “pacto de olvido.” 
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The ARMH was created in 2000 after the privately 
led exhumation of a mass grave of thirteen civilians 
killed by Republican gunmen in 1936. Many came to 
the excavation site in Leon Priaranza del Bierzo for 
assistance in finding other missing persons, which 
motivated those working at the site to create ARMH 
to provide such help. Since then, the group has 
worked to dignify Spain’s past, do justice for those 
who deserved it, and deepen Spanish democracy.85 
According to an El País survey, by July 2006, 64 
percent of those questioned wanted bodies from 
mass graves to be exhumed, identified, and returned 
to their families. 
Pressure to act before all the victims of the 
Franco regime were deceased further contributed 
to the new pro-justice consensus. The years 2005 
and 2006 marked the thirtieth anniversary of 
Franco’s death and the seventieth anniversary of 
the beginning of the Civil War, respectively. These 
anniversaries served as a reminder of both the time 
lapse since the Franco regime and the declining 
number of living victims of that regime. Descendants 
wanted monetary or other tangible compensation 
for their elder relations during their last years. Even 
those without personal connections to Franco-
regime victims acknowledged the urgency to address 
the issue while victims and relatives of victims were 
still alive.86 Such urgency was expressed during 
the debate over the Historical Memory Law, such as 
when Begoña Lasagabaster Olazábal of the Mixed 
Group said he took his ninety-seven year-old 
grandfather multiple times to request annulment 
of his sentence from the Military Division of 
the Supreme Court under the Franco regime.87 
Moreover, many with deceased relatives began to 
think, “Well, my grandfather is still buried in a 
clandestine grave. I want the body, I want the corpse, 
and I want a dignified process of re-vindication 
and a decent burial, not a clandestine one,” which 
Castresana-Fernandez confirmed was absolutely 
legitimate.88 
Clearly, the aging of the population and the 
desire for proper burial of victims served to foster 
discussion on reparation among the younger 
generation. The younger Spanish were therefore 
impelled to discuss reparation not only because 
of their distance from the atrocities of the Franco 
regime and their desire for breaking taboo, but also 
because of the social context in which they were 
embedded. The younger generation represented a 
constituency that, if not actively pressuring Congress 
to pursue retroactive justice, at least sought to hold 
accountable those representatives who were averse 
to measures of reparation. In fact, in all debate 
speeches, the PP complained that the PSOE was 
using the Historical Memory Law as a political 
weapon to boost its image and distort that of parties 
in opposition. The PSOE was operating under the 
assumption that the public would side with them in 
their pursuit of the reparation measure and against 
the PP who opposed the justice legislation, suggesting 
that the general constituency was supportive of 
justice for the Spanish people and disapproving of 
those against reparations. All this considered, it is 
evident that the Historical Memory Law came about 
in part due to the maturation of a younger Spanish 
generation in both the political arena and in Spanish 
society as a whole. 
To conclude, since the transition from 
dictatorship to democracy was achieved through 
negotiation rather than overthrow, remnants of the 
dictatorship, including societal divisions and sources 
of influence, remain. These remnants contributed 
to the indifference towards Franco and reservations 
towards reparation among those who lived during 
the Civil War and the dictatorship. However, 
the sheltered children and grandchildren of this 
generation did not harbor the same fears and ties to 
the past and, therefore, were more willing to confront 
it. The younger generation undertook the task of 
dignifying the memory of familial victims through 
the Association for the Recuperation of Historical 
Memory. Finally, the anniversaries of Franco’s death 
and the beginning of the Civil War reminded the 
country of the declining number of living victims 
as well as the waning time in which reparation and 
compensation would be relevant. Such generational 
factors certainly created a sense of urgency that 
was not achieved by the factors associated with the 
international community.
Section 3: Political Considerations
 Although many point to the Historical 
Memory Law as a heroic measure of reparations, 
others insist that the degree of justice achieved by 
the Law is overstated. Supporters of the bill often 
referred to it as a “starting point,” acknowledging 
the bill’s limitations as well as its potential to 
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serve as a precedent for future, more substantial, 
reparations.89 Others during the debate argued 
that the Law was trivial and would not satisfy 
anyone without remedying all persisting justice 
concerns.90 Because the Law encompassed sensitive 
and controversial topics, Congress struggled to 
reach a consensus on many areas of reparation.91 
Interviews and the congressional debate suggest 
that the PSOE strategized to acquire sufficient votes 
by compromising aggressive reparation in the Law. 
If this is the case, then the accomplishment of this 
justice law thirty years after the dictatorship seems 
like less of a feat.
Political Motivations Behind the Law
 The introduction of the Historical Memory 
Law itself was a strategic political move. The Law 
was not, in fact, included in the Socialist Worker’s 
Party manifesto for the 2004 general election, yet 
it eventually became a centerpiece of the PSOE’s 
legislative agenda once the Party came to power. 
It was meant to strengthen the Party’s position 
after a fortuitous election that swung votes in its 
favor, making the PSOE the majority party by only 
five percent.92 Out of a total of 394 members of 
Congress, 187 represented the PSOE, 170 represented 
the PP, and 47 were members of other parties. This 
illustrates the PSOE’s narrow margin of victory over 
the PP, which created a dually dominated Congress. 
The PSOE had to look for new opportunities, such as 
the Historical Memory Law, to garner support and 
retain their majority position in the next election. 
Esteban indeed cited the Law as an opportunistic play 
of the PSOE, comparing it to the issues of abortion 
and gay marriage used to strengthen and advertise 
its leftist politics as distinct from conservative 
ideologies. Additionally, in the bill’s congressional 
debate, PP deputies consistently accused the PSOE of 
manipulating reparation both for achieving political 
gain and attacking the PP’s conservative ties. For 
instance, Jorge Fernández Díaz claimed the purpose 
of the bill was “from day one, a deliberate attempt, 
make no mistake, to marginalize the [Popular] Party, 
to present this as a policy in which the opponents are 
factious, pro-Franco or fascists while the progressives 
understand the pain and suffering of the people.”93 
On the contrary, PP representative Manuel Atencia 
Roblado explained PP opposition to the Law as 
resistance to imposing an official historical memory 
and rejecting a single Law that simultaneously aimed 
to address an array of complex social justice issues.94 
Several PP speakers defended the party’s continuous 
support of reparations, reminding Congress of 
the past reparation measures they had enacted.95 
Nevertheless, the PSOE loosely painted opposition to 
the Law as opposition to victim reparation in order 
to tarnish the Popular Party’s public image. 
Still, the Socialist Worker’s Party lacked an 
absolute majority in Congress and thus had to appeal 
to other congressional parties to support the bill. 
During the political debate of the Historical Memory 
Law, discussions attempted to get the maximum 
consensus possible. Congress debated the first draft 
of the bill, from September 8, 2006, on December 
14, 2006, when three amendments were also 
presented. The United Left and the Republican Left 
presented the first two amendments as alternative 
texts for consideration and the PP presented the 
third amendment that simply requested withdrawal 
of the bill, yet Congress ultimately rejected all 
three of the amendments. Following this debate, 
377 more amendments to the bill were presented. 
Thus, agreement was a strenuous process and 
intense negotiations occurred up until the bill’s 
passage.96 In the end, the final Law sacrificed 
aggressive reparations to reach an agreement and is 
accordingly unsatisfactory for the formal authorities, 
international standards, and the victims.97 Patricia 
Esteban noted that a large part of the Spanish 
population believes the Law is useless, and she also 
felt that the Law has not made a significant impact on 
society. Many members of Congress demanded that 
the bill be more aggressive on certain reparations, 
yet to no effect, as outlined below. Ultimately, the 
PSOE was forced to reconcile with the PP, which 
underscores the role political maneuvering played in 
influencing the trajectory of the Historical Memory 
Law.
Strategic Specifications within the Law: Annulment of 
Judgments
The most frequent concern in the Historical 
Memory Law debate regarded annulment of 
judgments. Out of the thirty-six entries, it was 
mentioned seventeen times, taking up approximately 
47 percent of the debate. The Historical Memory 
Law declared illegitimate the military tribunals that 
condemned individuals based on political standings. 
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These thousands of judgments spanning from 1933 to 
1978 include criminal sentences for political, military, 
religious, or ideological reasons. Congressional 
deputies insisted these judgments occurred without 
due process of law, have errors of form and substance, 
and should be null and void. 
The main controversy was over the term 
“illegitimate,” which did not carry sufficient legal 
value. By declaring the judgments illegitimate, 
victims and their families were only allowed to 
“solicit individual reparation” before a council of five 
appointed senior social scientists who would examine 
each case independently before granting annulment 
or compensation—a process that could take decades. 
Many congressional deputies viewed the appeal 
process as an unfair burden on victims. They 
proposed amendments to make it the state’s duty 
to review these judgments, rather than to require 
50,000 people to sue for the same nullity. These 
amendments failed. Others suggested an explicit 
condemnation of the Franco dictatorship, whereby 
the regime would be formally expelled from the legal 
system and oppressive legislation and judgments 
from the period would be deemed crimes against 
humanity and repealed.iii Such a condemnation was 
rejected as well. In each of her three debate speeches, 
Congress member Joan Herrera Torres of the United 
Left cited this issue as the “main stumbling block 
in the negotiations with the government.”98  She 
noted that the governing PSOE party did not want 
the annulment of judgments and in the original 
text did not even declare the judgments illegitimate. 
Several other congressional representatives expressed 
the same frustration, citing hundreds of interest 
organizations, including Amnesty International, 
which agreed that Spain should abide by UN 
doctrine on crimes against humanity and annul 
these judgments.99 Nevertheless, opponents cited 
“legal difficulties” in annulling the military trials and 
deflected appeals for across-the-board annulment 
by saying that certain victims carried their sentences 
as medals of honor, “proud to have defended 
democracy.”100  
Thus the bill strategically addressed Franco’s 
repressive military judgments while avoiding 
a larger conflict over government obligation to 
review all military judgments of the time and 
over Franco’s legacy. The bill managed to sidestep 
iii  Twenty-eight percent of debate speeches expressed a desire for explicit 
condemnation of the Franco regime in the bill.
any governmental burden, either financial or 
temporal, that would have been borne if the 
government annulled sentences after the bill’s 
passage. This secured the PSOE the political credit 
for the reparation without incurring much expense. 
Declaring the judgments illegitimate rather than 
annulling them was beneficial not only for the ruling 
PSOE, but also for the Popular Party, which was 
notably silent on the annulment issue during the 
debate. The Popular Party, due to its historical link 
to the dictatorship, had a vested interest in Franco’s 
legacy. By maintaining rhetorical limitations in the 
document, Congress did not alienate the PP nor 
commit the PSOE to address or compensate for the 
sentences for years to come. In this manner, the final 
Historical Memory Law included the most passable, 
though necessarily unsubstantial, solution to Franco’s 
military judgments. 
Strategic Specifications within the Saw: the Valley of 
the Fallen
 The Valley of the Fallen was another 
prominent point of contention with the Law. Over 30 
percent of the debate speeches expressed discontent 
with Law’s solution for the Catholic basilica and 
memorial in the municipality of San Lorenzo de El 
Escorial, Spain. Franco conceived the area as a site 
to bury and honor those who died during the Civil 
War. The Valley of the Fallen remains controversial 
for two reasons. First, it was constructed in part 
by a workforce of prisoners of war. Secondly, it is 
a common burial ground for both Franco-regime 
victims and war victims from both sides.101 While 
some insisted that it would be disrespectful for the 
dictator to remain buried next to his victims, others 
argued that it would be dishonorable to disturb the 
monument. Uxue Barkos Berruezo of the Mixed 
Party fought during the debate to convert the Valley 
into a Civil War memorial.102 Esteban Bravo of the 
Vasco Group wanted to go even further, calling it 
“inadmissible” to have the tombs of both Franco and 
Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, a notable politician 
and lawyer executed by the regime during the war, 
occupy the same resting place. Bravo called for 
Franco’s remains to be relocated. On the other hand, 
Jorge Fernández Díaz of the Popular Party argued 
that the Valley of the Fallen was “first and foremost 
a place where the remains of 60,000 people who 
died during or as a result of the civil war are” and 
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firmly held that the area should remain undisturbed. 
The distinctly incompatible opinions on the bill’s 
dictation for the Valley of the Fallen resulted in an 
outcome that ultimately preserved the status quo. 
In the end, the Historical Memory Law simply 
prohibited demonstrations, political events, and 
exaltation of Franco at this burial place. Moreover, 
it provided that the grounds would be governed by 
the rules for establishments, places of worship, and 
public cemeteries. 
 These disagreements over the Valley of the 
Fallen complicated the debate of the Historical 
Memory Law and the bill ultimately fell short 
of transforming the site into a real symbol 
of reconciliation. In agreeing to offer limited 
reconciliation through the Valley of the Fallen, 
Spanish politicians kept the controversy surrounding 
the Valley from impeding the Law’s passage. Had 
the Valley measures been more explicit and drastic, 
crucial support would likely have been put in 
jeopardy. Disturbing any of the tombs would have 
put the Popular Party’s support at stake, while not 
addressing the Valley at all would have angered the 
Vasco Group, the Mixed Party, and others. Thus 
to appease such differing perspectives, the Law 
only minimally addressed the Valley of the Fallen. 
Clearly, the political maneuvering needed to pass 
the bill limited the extent of reparations possible. 
The dynamics of Spanish party politics made only a 
simple de-politicization of the Valley a possibility. 
Strategic Specifications within the Law: Grave 
Exhumations
 Finally, the Law was necessarily evasive in 
stipulating how mass grave exhumations would 
be administered. The Law provided state financial 
support and assistance for families in tracking, 
identifying, and eventually exhuming Franco victims 
who were subjected to extrajudicial executions and 
placed in mass graves unbeknownst to their families. 
Representatives from the Convergence and Union, 
Vasco, United Left, Republican Left and Mixed Group 
parties all attempted to secure active governmental 
responsibility for these identifications and 
exhumations during the political debate in Congress, 
yet in the end the Law simply allowed families to 
request authorization for such actions, without 
dictating any state duty. Carlos Castresana-Fernandez 
explained the difficulty of privatizing the exhumation 
process through the example of the famous poet 
Federico Garcia Lorca, who was executed by 
Nationalist forces. Evidence suggested Garcia Lorca 
was buried along with three or four other victims 
in a mass grave. While the families of the other 
victims all desired to exhume the bodies, Garcia 
Lorca’s family objected, thereby hindering the ability 
of other families to obtain proper burial for their 
relatives. Moreover, Castresana-Fernandez argued 
that with, “more than 100,000 forced disappearances, 
it is obviously a process that cannot be dealt with 
privately by the families.”103 This process was not 
only inefficient, but was also noncompliant with 
international human rights standards that mandate 
the state to establish truth and coordinate the legal 
consequences of reparation. In accordance with 
the UN “Right to a Remedy,” it is the duty of the 
state “to investigate violations effectively, promptly, 
thoroughly and impartially,” and conduct “the search 
for the whereabouts of the disappeared.”104 Still, the 
Garcia Lorca story illustrates the divide among the 
Spanish on whether to exhume these graves or leave 
the dead in peace. Instead of displaying a firm stance 
on the issue, the Law opted for a noncommittal 
reparation, keeping the current government from 
bearing any leadership burden in the process. It 
offered the government’s neutral support of grave 
exhumations as a facilitator rather than leader. 
Ultimately, these provisions kept the status-quo in the 
exhumation process, not ordering any exhumations 
but rather permitting individuals to deal with the 
graves of their relatives as they deemed fit. Although 
deputies could argue for a greater governmental role, 
such a compromise kept the grave exhumations from 
being a derisive issue that could potentially block the 
bill’s passage, and the public financing was deemed at 
least “a foundation.”105 
 In sum, while disagreements still remained 
among conservatives and progressives over the extent 
to which reparation should be given, a digression 
from the political sentiments of the dictatorship 
presented a new political atmosphere where all 
parties held democratic values and agreed that at 
least some recognition and reparation was necessary. 
Furthermore, the political circumstances of the 2004 
election provided the stimulus for the government to 
present the Historical Memory Law. Thus, politics in 
one sense advanced the cause of Spanish social justice 
and yet, in another sense, hindered it. The range 
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of pending issues of reparation and accountability 
that needed to be addressed made for complicated 
legislation that inevitably made it politically 
contentious. Because there was no consensus on 
several sensitive matters, such as truth commissions, 
exhumations, and nullification of judgments, 
strategic provisions in the Law intended to secure the 
most votes caused the final product to fall far short of 
compliance with international standards on remedy 
of human rights violations.
CONCLUSION
Instead of addressing the Franco regime’s 
violations once Spain’s democracy stabilized, Spain 
continued to shun its painful history for decades. 
Spain’s involvement with the United Nations, the 
development of international human rights norms, 
and other international justice pursuits in the 1990s 
set the stage for Spanish post-transitional justice in 
the early 2000s. With each passing year, the Spanish 
population became further removed from its painful 
history. Thus, by the thirtieth anniversary of Franco’s 
death and the seventieth anniversary of the Civil 
War in 2005 and 2006, respectively, Spain was more 
ready to face the Franco violations than ever before. 
Finally, the opportune moment for justice came 
after the 2004 congressional election, when the 
PSOE employed the past to strengthen its electoral 
advantage. Therefore, the “pacto de olvido” was 
finally broken by the Historical Memory Law in 2006, 
when favorable international, social, and political 
conditions converged.
The three factors contributing to Spanish justice 
all interplayed to foster an environment conducive 
to reparation and accountability. International 
social justice cases from Latin America to Eastern 
Europe informed public opinion of international 
justice norms. Grandchildren in Spain, sheltered 
from the reality of Franco’s human rights violations, 
saw the country arrest Pinochet in London and 
ultimately requested the same legal protection 
Spain provided for victims in foreign countries. 
With time ticking and a diminishing number of 
surviving victims, Spain faced a “now-or-never” 
moment to bring justice to those affected. The 
domestic push penetrated the political sphere by 
encouraging politicians to pass reparation measures 
and creating an atmosphere of disapproval toward 
representatives who outright opposed such measures. 
Taking advantage of this public opinion, the PSOE 
introduced the Historical Memory Law, in part to 
marginalize the conservative PP. Still, because of the 
issue’s complexity, the Law went through a process 
of negotiations and compromises that ultimately 
reduced the degree of justice incorporated. This 
confluence of factors accounts for why it took until 
2007 to pass significant reparations legislation such 
as the Historical Memory Law. However, conditions 
did not prove favorable enough to fully rectify 
transitional justice concerns, as the standards of “full 
and efficient reparation” defined by the UN were not 
all addressed. I argue that it was largely party politics 
that limited the scope of the Law.
All three factors (international human rights 
development, generational changeover, and political 
circumstances) were necessary for the Historical 
Memory Law to pass, yet none were singularly 
sufficient. Without international social justice 
developments, the Spanish public may not have been 
as adamant for reparations; without a public desire 
to grant reparations, Spanish politicians would have 
been less likely to support reparation measures; and 
without political cooperation, reparation measures 
could not have been officially enacted. Still, these 
considerations do not exclusively explain the Law’s 
passage. Other factors that may have played a role 
include domestic organizations, the media, and 
institutional frameworks. Further research into 
the existence and roles of such factors would be 
beneficial. Moreover, which of the three factors 
discussed contributed most to Spain passing the Law 
can be researched further. Finally, a study comparing 
the extent of reparation between countries pursuing 
justice immediately and those that pursue reparation 
retroactively would be useful to enhance our 
understanding of transitional justice.
Furthermore, the delay in Spanish justice 
pursuits has made subsequent attempts to 
secure reparations and retribution difficult.106 
Because Spain failed to implement reparation and 
accountability measures during the transition, 
pessimism for the future of reparations is apparent 
in Spain. Patricia Esteban commented that, if 
full reparation did not occur in 2008 while some 
of the direct victims and relatives of the victims 
were still alive, then restoration of memory and 
justice would likely never be achieved. As time 
passes, it will no longer be a priority, and “a legacy 
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of neglect and manipulation of the memory of 
the Franco dictatorship will remain for future 
generations.”107 Indeed, in November 2013, 
Spain maintained that it would not review the 
amnesty law for crimes committed during the war 
and dictatorship to a critical U.N. Committee on 
Enforced Disappearances.108 Though the Historical 
Memory Law has often been referred to as a “starting 
point” for bringing justice to the victims of Franco-
era crimes, one must wonder if there will ever be an 
ending point.
Finally, scholars must note that the trajectory of 
Spanish transitional justice has implications beyond 
its own borders. The factors that caused Spain to 
acknowledge its past crimes some seventy years 
later can shed light on efforts in other countries to 
revisit their past justice concerns. Advocates for 
retroactive justice can use the Spanish precedent to 
better understand when international, domestic, and 
political conditions in a country are favorable to its 
execution and how to capitalize on them. Moreover, 
the shortcomings of Spain’s delayed transitional 
justice process can inform other transitional justice 
cases—for example, teaching countries to be 
proactive in guaranteeing efficient reparation rather 
than delaying the process. Overall, the Spanish 
situation can shed light on how past human rights 
violations can be handled and when, if ever, it is too 
late to right past wrongs. 
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